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Abstract
Machine learning models often pose a threat to
the privacy of individuals whose data is part of
the training set. Several recent attacks have been
able to infer sensitive information from trained
models, including model inversion or attribute
inference attacks. These attacks are able to re-
veal the values of certain sensitive features of in-
dividuals who participated in training the model.
It has also been shown that several factors can
contribute to an increased risk of model inver-
sion, including feature influence. We observe
that not all features necessarily share the same
level of privacy or sensitivity. In many cases, cer-
tain features used to train a model are considered
especially sensitive and therefore propitious can-
didates for inversion.
We present a solution for countering model in-
version attacks in tree-based models, by reduc-
ing the influence of sensitive features in these
models. This is an avenue that has not yet been
thoroughly investigated, with only very nascent
previous attempts at using this as a countermea-
sure against attribute inference. Our work shows
that, in many cases, it is possible to train a model
in different ways, resulting in different influence
levels of the various features, without necessar-
ily harming the model’s accuracy. We are able to
utilize this fact to train models in a manner that
reduces the models reliance on the most sensitive
features, while increasing the importance of less
sensitive features. Our evaluation confirms that
training models in this manner reduces the risk
of inference for those features, as demonstrated
through several black-box and white-box attacks.
1. Introduction
Machine learning models have been shown to pose a threat
to the privacy of individuals whose data is part of the train-
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ing set. Over the past few years, several attacks have been
able to infer sensitive information from trained models. Ex-
amples include: membership inference attacks, where one
can deduce whether a specific individual was part of the
training set or not; and model inversion attacks, also called
attribute inference attacks, where certain sensitive features
can be inferred about individuals whose data was used to
train a model.
In model inversion (MI) attacks, a trained ML model is
used, alongwith additional information about an individual,
to infer the value of one or more sensitive attributes used in
the training of the model. These attacks may be performed
either in black-box manner, meaning that only the output
of the model on a particular input is known, or in a white-
boxmanner where internal parameters of the model are also
known. The additional information may include the values
of other features used in the model training process. Typi-
cally, such attacks are employed against individuals whose
data is part of the training set, since their success rate is
higher in this setting.
This has led some experts to conclude that machine learn-
ing models themselves can be considered personal informa-
tion under different data protection regulations such as the
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 and the
California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)2 (Veale et al.,
2018). This creates an even greater incentive for organiza-
tions to protect machine learning models from such attacks,
or even train models in a way that prevents them from being
susceptible to these attacks to begin with.
Many methods have been proposed to anonymize or de-
identify the training data of ML models, mostly focused
on preventing membership inference attacks. Far less atten-
tion has been dedicated to attribute inference, with only a
few, initial investigations of the subject (Zhao et al., 2019;
Alves et al., 2019). Fredrikson et al. (Fredrikson et al.,
2015) proposed a simple countermeasure to their own at-
tack against decision trees, by restricting the levels at which
sensitive attributes may appear in the tree. More recent
works have begun attempting to analyze and quantify the
risk of model inversion, as well as understand the risk fac-
tors that contribute to the success of such attacks. Some of
1https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu en
2https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill id=201720180AB375
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these works have identified feature influence as one of the
major contributing factors to attribute inference.
Building on these discoveries regarding the effect of a fea-
ture’s influence on the ability to invert it, and on the ini-
tial attempts at countermeasures introduced for decision
tree models, we propose a new privacy-guided approach to
training tree-based models. Our stretegy is based on guid-
ing the model training process to rely less on those features
defined as most sensitive, by reducing the amount of times
they are used in the model. Reducing how often the feature
is used by the model to make decisions, will make it more
difficult for attackers to succeed in extracting or inferring
information about it from the model.
Not all features necessarily have the same level of privacy
or sensitivity. In many cases, certain features used to train
a model are considered especially sensitive and therefore
propitious candidates for inversion. We utilize this fact to
train models in a manner that reduces the importance of the
most sensitive features, in turn increasing the importance
of the less sensitive features.
We propose and evaluate three slightly different methods
to achieve this reduction in feature importance. We imple-
mented and evaluated these methods in decision tree, ran-
dom forest, and AdaBoost models. We first show that each
of these methods does have some effect on the importance
of the feature, although somemethods work better than oth-
ers in certain combinations of datasets, features, and mod-
els. We then evaluate their effect on the success rate of
model inversion attacks on decision trees. Our results show
that it is indeed possible to reduce the success rate of such
attacks by reducing the importance of the attacked feature
in the model. In addition we demonstrate that, in many
cases, reducing the importance of one or more features has
a negligent effect on the model’s accuracy, and may even
come at no cost at all in terms of model accuracy.
Tha main contributions of this work are: (1) Three compli-
mentary methods for reducing the importance of sensitive
features in tree-based models; (2) Empirical validation that
reducing the importance of certain features can be done
without affecting the accuracy of the model; and (3) Ad-
ditional corroboration that a feature’s importance plays a
pivotal role in the ability to invert it through model inver-
sion attacks, and that reducing a feature’s importance can
help protect it from such attacks.
In the remainder of the paper we present the most rele-
vant background work in Section 2, describe our proposed
method in Section 3, and present our experimental results
in Section 4. We survey additional related work in Section
5 and finally conclude in Section 6.
2. Background
One of the first successful model inversion attacks was re-
alized in the domain of pharmacogenetics. Fredrikson et
al. (Fredrikson et al., 2014) demonstrated that, given a ma-
chine learning model for Warfarin dosing and some demo-
graphic information about a patient, it was possible to pre-
dict the patients genetic markers. In this case, the model
was a linear regression model that predicted a real-valued
suggested initial dose of the drug Warfarin. The attack was
a black-box attack, where the attacker had access only to
the output of the model for a given input.
Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart (Fredrikson et al., 2015)
later developed a new class of model inversion attack that
exploits the confidence values revealed along with the pre-
dictions. They employed both black and white-box attacks,
and showed their effectiveness in decision-tree models and
neural networks. They also initiated the experimental ex-
ploration of natural countermeasures, to examine whether
the level in the tree at which the sensitive feature occurs
can affect the accuracy of the attack. They developed a
privacy-aware decision tree training algorithm that is a sim-
ple variant of Classification And Regression Tree (CART)
learning. It takes a parameter l that specifies the priority
at which the sensitive feature is considered: the feature is
only considered for splitting after l− 1 other features have
already been selected, and removed from consideration af-
terwards. This is referred to by the authors as a preliminary
investigation designed to guide future countermeasure de-
sign; it was evaluated on a single feature and dataset. Dur-
ing this experiment, they discovered that when the feature
appears near the top or bottom of the tree, the attack fails
with greater probability than otherwise. They also found
that when the feature is placed at the top of the tree, classi-
fication accuracy is maximized while inversion accuracy is
greatly reduced.
More recently, a generative adversarial network (GAN)
based black-box model inversion attack has been shown to
be effective against deep-learning models such as convo-
lutional neural networks (Avodji et al., 2019). This work
was able to extract recognizable features from both image
recognition and skin classification models.
In 2016, a body of work began attempting to analyze and
quantify the risk of model inversion, as well as understand
the risk factors that contribute to the success of such at-
tacks. Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2016) started by presenting
a game-based methodology to formally study model inver-
sion attacks. They were the first to talk about influence as
a characteristic of MI attacks, and suggested that adding
noise may help to counter this effect. Their work provides
a methodology for both black-box and white-box attacks.
Their analysis is not limited to a certain type of model, but
does make certain assumptions about the model and fea-
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tures: it assumes a binary classification task where all fea-
tures are binary. The authors state that this methodology
can also be extended to binary classification over general-
ized but finite domains.
Around the same time, Papernot et al. (Papernot et al.,
2016) created a comprehensive threat model for ML, cat-
egorizing and taxonomizing attacks and defenses within an
adverserial framework. To solve the issue of learning and
inferring with privacy, they suggested using differential pri-
vacy techniques, by injecting random noise into the data,
the cost function of the learning algorithm, or the learned
parameters. However, they themselves note that learning
models with differential privacy guarantees is difficult be-
cause the sensitivity of the models is unknown for most
interesting ML techniques.
Yeom et al. (Yeom et al., 2018) continued to examine the
effect of overfitting and influence on the ability of an at-
tacker to learn information about the training data from
machine learning models. Using both formal and empiri-
cal analyses, they illustrated a clear relationship between
these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several pop-
ular machine learning algorithms. More specifically, they
showed that both overfitting and influence play an impor-
tant role in attribute inference, and found that the risk to in-
dividuals in the training data is greatest when these two fac-
tors are in balance. Influence in this case is defined as the
magnitude of change to the outcome as a result of changing
the sensitive features value.
3. Privacy-Guided Training of Models
Our approach is based on the assumption that reducing the
importance of a feature in the training of a model will in
turn reduce the risk of it being inverted by MI attacks. We
intuit that if a feature has little to no influence on the out-
come of the model, it will be difficult to use this outcome
to infer any meaningful information about the feature. If,
on the other hand, a feature is highly correlated with the
outcome of the model, it will be easier to deduce some-
thing about its content. In the extreme example of a single
feature having 100% importance, the outcome has a one-to-
one correlation with the feature.
In previous work (Wu et al., 2016; Yeom et al., 2018), the
authors found feature influence to be an important factor
in incurring privacy risk, alongside overfitting. In the con-
text of Boolean functions, Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2016) de-
fined influence as the probability that changing the sensi-
tive feature’s value will cause a change in the model’s out-
come. In the context of linear regression models, Yeom et
al. (Yeom et al., 2018) considered an analogous definition
of influence that characterizes the magnitude of change to
the outcome. In linear models, this corresponds to the ab-
solute value of the normalized coefficient of the sensitive
feature.
In our setting, we use the feature’s importance, which is
a model-dependent definition. In decision trees (and simi-
larly in random forests and other tree-basedmodels), impor-
tance is usually calculated as the decrease in node impurity
weighted by the probability of reaching the node, summed
over all nodes that split on the given feature. We used the
following equation for calculating importance values:
Imp(f) =
∑
i
(S(i)− E(li)− E(ri)) ·
ni
N
(1)
Where i enumerates over all nodes that split on feature f .
S(i) denotes the entropy value of node i (Gini index or
any other split criterion may also be used), ni denotes the
number of samples in node i and N denotes the overall
number of samples in the training set. li is the left child of
node i and ri is the right child. E, which is used to denote
the weighted entropy value of a child node, is calculated as
follows:
E(li) = S(li) ·
nli
ni
(2)
This importance calculation is similar to what is performed
in the widely used scikit-learn library3. Importance values
are in the range of 0 to 1, and the sum of importance values
over all features is 1.
We employed three different techniques to reduce the im-
portance of a feature in tree-based models. These are de-
scribed in the following sub-sections. Each method was
first implemented in a simple decision tree. These special
tree implementations were in turn used as a basis for im-
plementing additional tree-based models, such as random
forest and AdaBoost. In the ensemble-based methods, the
limitations described were applied separately on each tree.
3.1. Weight-based Penalty
In this method, each feature is assigned a weight according
to its sensitivity level: the higher the sensitivity, the higher
the weight. Weight values are in the range of 0 to 1, 0
signifying a non-sensitive feature. During the training pro-
cess, when searching for the split with minimum entropy
(or Gini index) at each stage, we use the feature’s weight as
a penalty. For a node i that splits on feature f with weight
wf , we replace the original entropy of the node with:
S(i) · (1 + wf ) (3)
(The addition of 1 ensures that a feature with weight 0 will
remain with its original entropy). This is analogous to the
class weighting method described by Polo et al. (Polo et al.,
2007). However, they assigned different weights to differ-
ent classes in order to represent the relative importance of
3https://scikit-learn.org/
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each class, whereas we assign different weights to differ-
ent features. After performing this weighted entropy cal-
culation, features with higher sensitivity (i.e., weight) will
yield higher entropy values, thus penalizing splits on more
sensitive features.
3.2. Limiting the Level of Splits
Building on an idea previously proposed as a countermea-
sure against tree inversion (Fredrikson et al., 2015), this
method limits the levels at which splits can be made on
a sensitive feature. In the original method proposed by
Fredrikson et al., the sensitive feature is only considered
for splitting after l − 1 other features have already been
selected and removed from consideration afterwards. How-
ever, we define a threshold for the highest level in the tree
at which the sensitive features may be split. In other words,
at any level higher than the threshold, these features are not
considered for splitting; once the threshold is reached, they
may be considered for any subsequent split. We consider
the level as the distance from the root of the tree.
This method does not directly limit the number of splits
that can be performed on a certain feature. That said, it
does affect the feature’s importance by forcing it to be used
in splits that affect fewer samples (the higher the split in the
tree, the more samples it affects, and vice versa).
The threshold level for being considered for a split is cus-
tomizable, and may differ between datasets and model
types. Intuitively, the deeper the trees in the initial model,
the higher this threshold will have to be in order to effec-
tively limit the importance of sensitive features. The results
presented in Section 4 were obtained by varying this param-
eter to yield different importance/accuracy trade-offs.
3.3. Limiting the Number of Splits
Since the importance of a feature is summed over all nodes
that split on that feature, we decided to try directly limit-
ing the number of splits on sensitive features. The number
of splits for each feature is counted. Once the threshold is
met, that feature is no longer considered for splitting. To
avoid creating an imbalance in the tree, where a certain fea-
ture is used heavily on the left side of the tree and then no
longer used on the right side, we implemented a breadth-
first-search (BFS) version of tree training. Thus, a feature
is considered for splitting in a balancedmanner near the top
of the tree, and is no longer considered towards the bottom,
once the maximum number of splits is reached.
The number of allowed splits is customizable, and may dif-
fer between datasets and model types. Here, again, the
larger the initial trees (i.e., the number of internal nodes
in the tree), the higher this threshold will have to be. The
results presented in Section 4 were obtained by varying
this parameter to yield different importance/accuracy trade-
offs.
We also implemented weighted variants of methods 3.2 and
3.3, a normalized variant of method 3.3 (where the split
number is normalized by the number of samples in each
split), as well as different combinations of all of the above
methods. However, these did not significantly improve our
results.
4. Evaluation
We evaluated our method using two openly available
datasets: the Nursery dataset4 and the GSS marital happi-
ness dataset5. The Nursery dataset was derived from a hier-
archical decision model originally developed to rank appli-
cations for nursery schools in Slovenia. It was used by Bild
et al. (Bild et al., 2018) to compare approaches for differen-
tially private statistical classification. The GSS marital hap-
piness dataset is a subset of the GSS data created by Joseph
Price to study various societal effects of pornography. It
was used by Fredrikson et al. (Fredrikson et al., 2015) to
evaluate the effectiveness of a model inversion attack. We
removed records that did not have a value for the label fea-
ture, which was the case for almost half of the records in the
GSS dataset. We also removed records whose label value
was too scarce. This resulted in 12,958 samples in the Nurs-
ery dataset and 24,455 samples in the GSS dataset. Each
dataset was divided into 80% training and 20% test.
We tested three types of tree-based models: Decision Tree
(dt), Randofm Forest (rf), and AdaBoost (ab).
4.1. Reducing Importance of Features
For each dataset, we first chose different random subsets
of features to define as sensitive features. Next, we built a
privacy-awaremodel that takes as input the sensitivity level
of each feature. We recorded both the accuracy of the re-
sulting model on our hold-out test dataset, as well as the
new importance values of the selected features. We ran ex-
periments on all combinations of dataset, model type and
privacy-guided method (described in Section 3). Select re-
sults for a single feature are shown in Figures 1 and 2. For
reproducibility purposes, the threshold/weight values used
in each run are brought in the Appendix.
Not all of the methods for reducing the importance of sen-
sitive features worked well in all cases. Some methods
worked better for certain model types, datasets, or features
that we tested. Table 1 presents these results. We marked a
combination of method and model type as successful (with
an X) if we were able to find at least one feature for which
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/nursery
5http://byuresearch.org/ssrp/downloads/GSShappiness.pdf
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Figure 2.Model accuracy vs. feature importance in GSS data
Dataset Method Decision
Tree
Random
Forest
AdaBoost
Nursery Weights X
Levels X
Splits X X X
GSS Weights X X
Levels X X
Splits X X X
Table 1. Success of different privacy-guided methods
the method worked. In many cases, we were able to reduce
the importance without harming accuracy too much. This
was even the case for some of the most important features
(initially), as in the example of the ‘age’ and ‘children’ fea-
tures in the GSS dataset, which were consistently found to
be the most important features across all models before ap-
plying privacy-guided training. In some cases it was even
possible to bring them down to 0 importance without harm-
ing accuracy, as shown in Figure 2. Surprisingly, in some
cases, the accuracy was even improved. This is another
indication that the choice of features to split made during
model training is not always optimal.
This does not mean, however, that these mothods necessar-
ily work for any feature in the dataset. In fact, there were
some features whose importance could not be reduced with-
out significantly harming the model’s accuracy.
We also conducted experiments with multiple sensitive fea-
Num features Model accu-
racy
Accumulated
importance loss
1 92.57 0.044
2 92.67 0.067
3 91.22 0.117
4 91.03 0.189
5 91.61 0.236
6 92.18 0.264
Table 2. Accumulated importance loss for multiple features
tures. These experiments were performed with sets of ran-
domly selected features. Results for the Nursery dataset,
decision tree model, and method 3.1 (weights) are pre-
sented in Table 2. In addition to the model’s accuracy, we
show the sum of importance losses over all sensitive fea-
tures. The higher this number, the better since this repre-
sents the degree by which the importance of all of these
features decreased collectively. Our results show that even
with relatively high numbers of sensitive attributes (up to 6
out of 14), it is possible to gain a meaningful reduction in
the importance of these features with a very low impact on
the model’s accuracy. The last line in the table, displaying
an accumulated importance loss of 0.264, corresponds to
an overall initial importance of 0.507 summed over those 6
features; this thus represents a 50% combined reduction in
the importance of these features.
4.2. Reducing Risk of Model Inversion
Next, we chose one categorical feature in each dataset that
had a relatively high importance, and could not simply be
removed from the model without causing a significant de-
cline in model accuracy. We then tried to infer the value
of that feature using black-box (bb) and white-box (wb)
model inversion attacks. The reasoning behind this choice
was that if a feature can simply be removed without harm-
ing the accuracy of the model, there is no need for any
special “privacy-aware” training process. It can simply
be removed from the training. We found this to be the
case, for example, for the ‘X-rated movies’ feature that was
used in the inversion attacks described by Fredrikson et al.
(Fredrikson et al., 2015).
For the GSS dataset we chose to attack the happiness fea-
ture, which had an initial importance of 0.315. For the
Nursery dataset we chose the social feature, with an initial
importance of 0.043. For simplicity of the attack implemen-
tation, we transformed each of these features to be Boolean,
i.e., a feature that can only receive two values, 0 and 1. For
the happiness feature, we assigned the value 1 to any record
containing the initial value ‘Very happy’, and 0 for the rest,
yielding a prior distribution of [0.6, 0.4] for the values 0
and 1, respectively. For the social feature, we assigned the
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value 1 to any record containing the initial value ‘problem-
atic’ and 0 for the rest, yielding a prior distribution of [0.66,
0.34]. Here we also removed any rows missing values for
the attacked feature.
We recorded the accuracy of each type of attack, once using
the original model and once using the equivalent privacy-
aware model. The description of each of the attacks ap-
pears in the Appendix. We also compared these with the re-
sults of what we consider a “baseline” attack, referred to as
the ideal adversary in (Fredrikson et al., 2015). This attack
consists of training an ML model on the original dataset to
predict the sensitive attribute. In our case, we used a neu-
ral network model for this “ideal” attack. Those results are
presented in Figure 3.
These results demonstrate that it is indeed possible to re-
duce the success rate of model inversion attacks by re-
ducing the importance of the sensitive (attacked) feature
in the underlying model, as suggested by previous work.
The baseline ‘ideal’ attack, which does not depend on the
model, is not directly affected by these changes and re-
mains more or less constant, as we expected.
We performed two additional experiments with the aim of
disproving the argument that the attacks’ accuracy may de-
teriorate due to a decline in the original model’s accuracy.
In the first experiment, we used our privacy-guided train-
ing algorithm to generate models with decreased accuracy
due to the reduced importance of other features (not the
attacked feature). We show in Figure 4 that the success
rate of the attacks on the sensitive feature is not affected by
this reduction in model accuracy and remains more or less
static. This demonstrates that decreasing model accuracy
alone, while keeping the attacked feature’s importance at
the same level, is not effective in countering attribute infer-
ence attacks.
In the second experiment, which was done on the GSS
dataset, we were able to use our privacy-guided training
algorithm to cause an increase in the attacked feature’s im-
portance (by decreasing the importance of other features
in the model). In this experiment, we observed that the at-
tacks’ success increases with the increase of the feature’s
importance relative to the original model, with almost con-
stant model accuracy. The results are shown in Figure 5. As
expected, the ideal attack is not affected by these changes
as it does not depend on the model.
5. Related Work
5.1. Membership Inference and Other Attacks
There have been several attempts at membership inference
attacks, where one can deduce whether a specific individ-
ual was part of the training set or not. Examples include
the work of Shokri et al. (Shokri et al., 2017) and Salem
et al. (Salem et al., 2019). As a result, a great body of
prior work has focused on protecting the privacy of the
training dataset used to train machine learning models from
such attacks. Approaches that add noise during the train-
ing process have been proposed to protect people partici-
pating in the training set and counter membership attacks
(Zhang et al., 2018). The idea behind this approach is to
reduce the effect of any single individual on the model’s
outcome. Some have even applied the principle of differ-
ential privacy to the training process (Abadi et al., 2016;
Holohan et al., 2019), which provides more robust privacy
guarantees. Papernot et al. (Papernot et al., 2018) show
how Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE) can
scale to learning tasks with large numbers of output classes
and uncurated, imbalanced, training data with errors. The
PATE approach transfers to a “student” model the knowl-
edge of an ensemble of “teacher” models, with intuitive
privacy provided by training teachers on disjoint data and
strong privacy guaranteed by noisy aggregation of teachers’
answers.
However, a recent survey of existing techniques based
on differential privacy (Jayaraman & Evans, 2019) found
that current mechanisms for differentially private machine
learning rarely offer acceptable utility-privacy trade-offs
for complex learning tasks. Settings that provide limited
accuracy-loss provide little effective privacy, and settings
that provide strong privacy result in useless models. More-
over, it was recently shown that differentially private train-
ing mechanisms have a disproportionate effect on the ac-
curacy of the model for underrepresented or complex sub-
groups, leading to an increased bias towards these popula-
tions (Bagdasaryan & Shmatikov, 2019).
Moreover, most of these methods are aimed at preventing
membership inference attacks and not attribute inference
attacks. Fredrikson et al. (Fredrikson et al., 2014) specif-
ically evaluated the effectiveness of differential privacy to
prevent their attack and reached the conclusion that for pri-
vacy budgets that are effective at preventing the attack, the
utility of the model is lethally damaged, potentially expos-
ing patients to increased risk of stroke, bleeding events, and
mortality.
Recently, a technique based on adversarial regularization
was proposed to protect models against membership in-
ference (Nasr et al., 2018). The researchers introduced a
mechanism that can train models with membership privacy,
while ensuring indistinguishability between the predictions
of a model on its training data and other data points (from
the same distribution). They achieved this by minimizing
the accuracy of the best black-box membership inference
attack against the model, using an adversarial training al-
gorithm that minimizes the prediction loss of the model as
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well as the maximum gain of the inference attacks.
Ateniese et al. (Ateniese et al., 2015) devised a different
type of attack on machine learning models, which was
aimed at stealing trade secrets. Another type of attack pro-
posed by He, Zhang, and Lee (He et al., 2019) compro-
mises the privacy of inference data in collaborative deep
learning systems. In this setting, when a deep neural net-
work and the corresponding inference task are split and dis-
tributed to different participants, they show that one mali-
cious participant can accurately recover an arbitrary input
fed into the system by another participant.
5.2. Defenses Against Attribute Inference
Zhao et al. (Zhao et al., 2019) present a theoretical frame-
work for privacy-preservation under the attack of attribute
inference. They propose a minimax optimization formula-
tion to protect the given attribute and analyze its privacy
guarantees against arbitrary adversaries. They also prove
an information-theoretic lower bound to precisely charac-
terize the fundamental trade-off between utility and pri-
vacy. They then proceed to analyze different existing pri-
vacy preservation algorithms to see if they uphold the lower
bound in practice, and characterize their trade-off between
privacy and utility.
Attriguard (Jia & Gong, 2018) uses evasion attacks from
adversarial machine learning to defend against attribute in-
ference attacks. However their setting is quite different
from ours. They assume that the attacker uses a machine
learning classifier to infer target private attributes based on
public data. They further assume that the defender does
not have access to this model or to the private attributes.
Their solution is based on adding noise directly to users’
public data. In our work, we assume that the defender is
the owner of the machine learning model, and has access to
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both public and private attributes of the users used to train
the model. Our goal is to prevent an attacker from inferring
private attribute values from the public data and model.
Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2017) present a novel context-
aware privacy framework called generative adversarial pri-
vacy (GAP). Under GAP, learning the privacy mechanism
is formulated as a constrained minimax game between two
players: a privatizer that sanitizes the dataset in a way that
limits the risk of inference attacks, and an adversary that
tries to infer the private variables from the sanitized dataset.
This solution is intended for settings where a data holder
would like to publish a dataset in a privacy preserving
fashion; it is not geared specifically for building privacy-
preserving ML models.
MLPrivacyGuard (Alves et al., 2019) is a countermeasure
against black-box confidence-based model inversion at-
tacks. It is based on adding controlled noise to the out-
put of the confidence function, causing numerical approx-
imation of gradient ascent to be unable to converge. This
method was shown to be effective against attacks that apply
gradient ascent on the confidence returned by the model.
Whereas this method may be capable of countering a cer-
tain class of attacks, our method does not assume any spe-
cific attack. We demonstrate its effectiveness on several
types of attacks, both black-box and white-box.
5.3. Privacy Protection of Tree-Based Models
Additional work aimed specifically at tree-based models in-
cludes protocols for privately evaluating decision trees and
random forests (Wu et al., 2016). This work was carried
out in a client-server setting, where the server has a de-
cision tree (or random forest) model and the client holds
an input to the model. They aimed at preserving the fol-
lowing security property: at the end of the protocol execu-
tion, the server would learn nothing about the input, and the
client would learn nothing about the model. Also based on
the concept of secure multiparty computation, Fritchman
et al. (Fritchman et al., 2018) presented a first framework
for privacy-preserving classification of tree ensembles with
application in healthcare. Obviously, both of these works
tackle a very different setting than ours, which is to protect
the privacy of the training set against attribute inference.
Truex et al. (Truex et al., 2017) revisited the concepts
and techniques of privacy-preserving decision tree learn-
ing. They reviewed and compared the privacy notions and
properties of three orthogonal, yet complimentary, techni-
cal frameworks: randomization-baseddata obfuscation, dif-
ferential privacy, and secure multiparty computation, ana-
lyzing their effectiveness.
6. Conclusions
We presented a simple solution for countering model inver-
sion attacks in tree-based models. We proposed three com-
plimentary methods for reducing the importance of certain
features, and showed that, in many cases, it is possible re-
duce a feature’s importance without necessarily harming
the model’s accuracy. We presented results for three dif-
ferent types of models: decision trees, random forests and
AdaBoost.
We also validated that a feature’s importance indeed plays
a pivotal role in how vulnerable it is to inversion, and that
reducing a feature’s importance may help protect it from
such inversion attacks; this was demonstrated through sev-
eral black-box and white-box attacks. Moreover, we dis-
proved the potential argument that the attacks’ chance of
success may drop simply due to a decline in the original
model’s accuracy.
In the future, we plan to extend this work to additional
types of models, focusing on neural networks, which have
grown in popularity. We also plan to investigate additional
risk factors and countermeasures for model inversion.
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A. Description of attacks used for evaluation
We implemented three attacks aimed at inferring the value
of a sensitive feature of an individual who participated in
the training of a machine learning model M. We assumed
the worse case with regard to the information available to
the attacker in each case. In all three attacks we assumed
that the attacker has access to all attribute values except for
the sensitive attribute for the given individual, as well as ac-
cess to enough labeled training data (including the value of
the sensitive/attacked feature that we want to learn). We
later refer to this dataset as the attack training set. In
all cases we used the attack training set to train an attack
model, and then measured its accuracy on a test set.
In the black-box attack we assumed that the attacker also
has knowledge of the model’s output (classification) for the
given individual; and in the white-box attack we assumed
that the attacker has knowledge of the model’s internals, in-
cluding the number of samples in the training set that were
mapped to each leaf in the tree. This is a similar setup to
the one described in (Fredrikson et al., 2015). Each of these
attacks is described in more detail in the following subsec-
tions.
A.1. Baseline attack
In this attack we did not use the ML model at all, we only
assumed access to all attribute values except the sensitive
attribute for a given individual. In this attack we basi-
cally trained a simple neural network model on the none-
sensitive attributes (on the attack training set) and tried to
predict the value of the sensitive attribute (on the test set).
In our implementation we used the default configuration
of scikit-learn’s MLPClassifier, i.e., one hidden layer with
100 neurons, relu activation and adam optimization. We
use this as a baseline to compare to the other two model
inversion attacks.
A.2. Black-box attack
This attack is almost the same as the baseline attack except
that it uses the output (classification) of the model M in ad-
dition to the none-sensitive attribute values when training
the neural network. Again we used the default configura-
tion of scikit-learn’s MLPClassifier to learn and predict the
value of the sensitive attribute.
A.3. White-box attack
In this attack we assume full access to the model, i.e., the
ability to use it to generate new predictions on inputs of our
choice, as well as examine the internals of the model. We
also use in this attack knowledge of the prior distribution of
the attacked feature in the original training data, which we
approximate by using the distribution in the attack training
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set.
We denote the vector of known feature values by xK and
the known model prediction/classification for the full vec-
tor x by y. We assume x1 is the sensitive feature being
attacked and denote by v the specific values this feature
may take.
Given a sample (xK , y) to attack, we start by generating a
dummy sample for each of the possible values for the sen-
sitive (unknown) feature. In our case we used boolean fea-
tures, so we created two dummy samples: 0, xK and 1, xK .
We then retrieved the model M’s predictions for each of
these dummy samples, denoted by y0 and y1 respectively.
If y0 and y1 are different and one of them matches the
known value y, we use the corresponding value v (0 or 1)
as our prediction for the sensitive feature value. Otherwise,
we use a simplified version of the calculation presented in
(Fredrikson et al., 2015):
P (x1 = v) =
m∑
i=1
piφi(v) · Pr[x1 = v] (4)
We denote by the shorthand P (x1 = v) the probability that
x1 = v given the auxiliary information. φi(v) is an indi-
cator for the path (leaf) in the tree that corresponds to the
sample v, xK . When interating i over all m paths (or leaf
nodes) in the tree, only one indicator receives the value 1
(the path that corresponds to the sample) and the rest re-
ceive the value 0. pi is the number of samples mapped to
that leaf divided by the overall number of training samples
(ni/N ) and Pr[x1 = v] is the prior probability of the value
v in the attack training data.
We calculate the probability for each of the possible values
v (in our case 0 and 1) and choose the value with the highest
probability.
B. Parameter Values Used in Evaluation
In this section we present the paramters used for each run
presented in Figures 1-3 in the main paper. This informa-
tion is brought in Tables 3-8; each table details the used
parameter (weight, level number or split number, accord-
ing to the chosen method), along with the corresponding
importance value.
Table 9 presents the number of splits versus the result-
ing model accuracy for the experiment whose results are
brought in Figure 4 in the main paper. The following fea-
tures were defined as sensitive when building the privacy-
guided tree: children, health, has nurs, parents, housing
and finance.
Table 10 presents the number of features defined as sensi-
tive when building the privacy-guided tree versus the impor-
Level Importance
10 0.118
25 0.08
50 0.06
75 0.046
100 0.036
Table 3. Level values for Figure 1, Decision Tree model
Splits Importance
15 0.074
12 0.043
10 0.04
9 0.046
Table 4. Split values for Figure 1, Random Forest model
Weight Importance
0.2 0.095
0.4 0.058
0.6 0.044
0.8 0.031
1.0 0.032
Table 5. Weight values for Figure 2, Adaboost model
Level Importance
400 0.029
500 0.015
750 0.003
1000 0.0
Table 6. Level values for Figure 2, Adaboost model
Splits Importance
30 0.049
10 0.046
5 0.04
3 0.025
2 0.02
1 0.012
Table 7. Split values for Figure 3, Nursery data
Level Importance
3000 0.08
7000 0.061
9000 0.041
10000 0.005
Table 8. Level values for Figure 3, GSS data
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Splits Model Accuracy
50 97.64
30 96.48
10 92.51
5 90.97
3 89.96
Table 9. Split values for Figure 4
Num sensitive fea-
tures
Importance of happiness fea-
ture
0 0.315
9 0.346
11 0.504
14 0.572
15 0.91
17 0.977
Table 10. Split values for Figure 5
tance of the attacked feature (happiness) for the experiment
whose results are brought in Figure 5 in the main paper.
